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An increased focus on understanding and managing the reactions of affected populations has 
led to hybridity being an important part of the discussions about, and applications of, 
transitional justice. However, despite the presence of ‘resistance’ as an active component in 
theories of hybrid peace, there is very limited in-depth theoretical or empirical work on 
resistance to transitional justice. The content of this paper addresses this gap in two main ways. 
First, it asks what we can learn from theories of hybrid peace about resistance to transitional 
justice. Second, it proposes a particular approach to resistance which would allow for a more 
dynamic and ultimately more useful understanding of resistance to transitional justice, its 
intentions and its meanings. By drawing on empirical examples in a number of different 
transitional contexts, the argument presented here states that not only must we seek to 
understand the nature of resistance as a part of hybridity, but we must do so by analysing the 
relational process through which acts come to be defined as resistance.  
 
Keywords: hybridity, human rights, intervention, resistance, peacebuilding, transitional justice 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The term hybridity as it is currently used with reference to peacebuilding interventions 
refers to the process by which external peacebuilding interventions are transformed through 
contact with local contexts and agents. With regards to transitional justice this can include a 
managed form of hybridity, deliberately bringing together the international and local in order 
to create more legitimate mechanisms and processes, or it can include reference to trying to 
understand more spontaneous forms of hybridity in the everyday translation and transformation 
of transitional justice practice in local contexts. The academic and practitioner interest in 
hybridity of transitional justice can be traced to an increasing interest in the relationship 
between populations affected by massive human rights violations of the past and the specific 
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interventions designed to address them. In particular, the recognition that transitional justice as 
a normative ambition is in fact political and contested has led to a plethora of work exploring 
the reactions and perspectives of affected populations as well as the biases and practices of 
marginalisation within transitional justice itself. 
 
The political and contested nature of transitional justice has been convincingly argued 
elsewhere (see for example McEvoy and McGregor 2008), and the purpose of this paper is not 
to rehearse such arguments but instead to take them as entry points into an under-explored 
aspect of these tensions: that of resistance. Whilst much of the literature on transitional justice 
in the last ten years has highlighted the lines along which disagreement may surface, for 
example lack of cultural sensitivity, imposition of international norms, and accusations of 
victor’s justice among others, there has been very little detailed analysis of what happens when 
people do resist transitional justice, why they might resist and what it means when they do. 
Instead, what we have seen in practice terms is an increased concern with managing the 
responses of affected populations to transitional justice processes, increasing ownership, 
legitimacy and decreasing popular discontent through a process of buy in. This has included, 
among other aspects, hybridity.  
 
Despite the presence of discussions on hybridity in terms of transitional justice practice, 
reference to hybridity has not yet been mobilised in the literature as an opportunity to engage 
more directly with resistance to transitional justice. This is interesting given the inclusion of 
resistance as an active component in typologies of hybrid peace, meaning that hybridity as an 
analytical framework is in theory well placed to engage more directly with the question of 
resistance to transitional justice, and how such resistance plays out in the contestation and re-
shaping of justice initiatives. The focus of this paper is on exploring whether the way in which 
resistance is understood and mobilised in theories of hybrid peace enables us to analyse 
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resistance to transitional justice, and if not, what other areas of scholarship can be drawn on in 
order to move us forward in this task.  
 
Scholarship on hybrid peace starts from a position of questioning the ways in which 
external actors intervene in post conflict contexts as part of a liberal peacebuilding agenda1. 
Such critiques echo those made in the transitional justice literature, and include the imposition 
of western norms of liberalism, a lack of understanding of the contexts in which violence and 
peace occur, a top-down approach which favours external ‘expertise’ rather than local 
‘knowledge’ and a one-size-fits all approach in the face of diverse and relevant local cultures 
(see for example Leeuwen, Verkoren and Boedeltje 2012 for a summary). From these critiques 
has emerged the use of the term ‘hybridity’ by a number of scholars who propose a new 
taxonomy of peacebuilding (Heathershaw 2013). In relation to peacebuilding hybridity is 
described in a multitude of ways according to varied perspectives and priorities, but in general 
and simplified terms it is used to refer to the mixing and transformation of liberal peacebuilding 
interventions (read international or external) and the local when they meet in peacebuilding 
contexts. Peterson refers to this as a ‘contact zone’ between the local and external, the latter of 
which is characterised as liberal, externally driven aid interventions (2012: 11). 
 
In literature which engages with hybridity in terms of peacebuilding, ‘hybridity’ is at 
once an analytical category or framework which can act as a lens through which to view 
societies which are the subject of peacebuilding interventions, and at the same time a descriptive 
term for what scholars of hybridity believe exists as a reality on the ground. Importantly, 
underpinning much of the literature on hybridity, particularly that which comes from critical 
                                                          
1 I acknowledge that liberal peace is not one set of practices and priorities, but such a discussion is not the 
focus of this paper. There are others who engage directly with this issue, see for example Richmond, Oliver. 
2006. “The Problem of peace: Understanding the ‘liberal peace’.” Conflict, Security and Development 6(3): 291-
314. 
 5 
 
peace studies, is a sense of the “supposed transformative power of hybridity” in which 
resistance against particular forms of hegemony provide hope of an alternative to liberal 
peacebuilding interventions from the ‘outside’ (Ibid: 16). 
 
I argue in this paper that whilst hybridity has something to offer an analysis of resistance 
to transitional justice, the static way in which resistance is understood in much of the hybridity 
literature cannot capture the most useful analysis of the motivations, forms and implications of 
resistance to transitional justice. Building on this, I develop an argument for a particular 
approach to resistance as relational i.e. that what counts as resistance is a matter of subjective 
position of the actor. It is argued that this relational approach to resistance is important because 
it can move us beyond dichotomies of resistor/resisted and of powerless/powerful which cannot 
allow for the fluid landscapes of resistance in transition contexts. Such landscapes are shaped 
by the micro politics of the legitimacy of the transitional justice process, of the divergent voices 
defining peace and justice, and of the dynamics which prioritise some voices over others. 
 
2 Hybridity in Transitional Justice: Shedding Light on Resistance? 
 
2.1 Hybrid Transitions 
 
As an entry point I accept the assertion that transitional justice – as the sum of 
mechanisms designed to address human rights violations committed as part of a conflict, 
authoritarian rule or occupation – is part of liberal peacebuilding (Sriram 2009). As such it has 
also been accused of imposing externally validated norms in a technocratic, instrumentalist way 
(Rubli 2012) designed to transform societies not only in terms of institutional reform but also 
in terms of attitudes and behaviours. Moreover, as a project embedded within the liberal peace 
it too reproduces the “fundamental narrative of liberalism [which] is one of transformation (or 
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resistance to transformation)” (MacGinty 2012: 181). As befits an area of scholarship which 
has been strengthening since the 1980s a recent critical turn has been reflecting on these 
critiques with a concurrent series of debates, all of which revolve around a core discussion over 
whether it is the way of doing transitional justice which is the problem, or whether as a 
normative project it should be abandoned (see for example Rabkin 2005). These debates have 
been sharpened by a lack of ‘evidence’ on the positive impact of transitional justice2.  
 
Reflecting one part of such debates, Ojara has written that “as a moral vocabulary the 
language of human rights offers ways of talking about the experiences of people; the language 
offers a way of perceiving, imagining and interpreting suffering” (2012: 180). Indeed, the 
centrality of human rights language to transitional justice (which seeks redress for such harms) 
leads to a tendency towards demanding consensus on the nature of the violations which have 
taken place and on the way in which it should be redressed. This is a consensus which some 
have described as silencing (Campbell and Turner 2008), disciplining (Iliff 2012) and 
constraining of debate (Meister 2002). In the realities on the ground there have been examples 
of dissatisfaction, frustration, refusal to participate and the continuation of justice practices 
which have been termed, not unproblematically, in the literature as ‘local’ or ‘traditional’ (see 
for example Baines 2007; Quinn 2014) and which do not necessarily coincide with liberal 
norms of justice. This reflects alienation from, and dissatisfaction with, the process in reaction 
to the promotion of certain values over others (Van de Merwe, Baxter and Chapman 2009); 
values which are held to be ‘good’ for transition such as the rule of law, individual human rights 
and liberal democracy.  
 
                                                          
2 Impact is a focus in much of the current scholarship on transitional justice. A desire to demonstrate whether 
or not transitional justice works can be exemplified in the work of Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh. Payne and Andrew G. 
Reiter (2010) ‘The Justice Balance: When Transitional Justice Improves Human Rights and Democracy’ Human 
Rights Quarterly 32(4): 980-1007. 
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As a response to these challenges transitional justice has been subject to calls for greater 
attention to be placed on the local, and for transitional justice processes themselves to reflect 
this. This reflects ambivalence within the practice of transitional justice: a desire to apply and 
support international law and norms on human rights and their violations, while at the same 
time acknowledging that the longer-term processes which transitional justice is supposed to 
support, such as reconciliation, must become locally embedded in order to affect the kinds of 
social transformation required for a sustainable and just peace. A concern with such local ‘buy 
in’ has led to an increased focus on managing local responses to transitional justice processes 
and on different forms of hybridity, both those which are managed and those which arise in an 
unplanned fashion. Sriram has written that transitional contexts are themselves “frequent sites 
of hybridity, in which the interaction of local, national and international actors shape decisions 
about accountability in ways that evolve over time” (2012: 58). This can be seen as an inevitable 
result of the nature of transitional justice as a “contested space” (McEvoy and McGregor 2008) 
in which negotiations and compromises over political, legal and moral dilemmas take place 
(Sriram 2009). Surprisingly resistance has not often been a core part of these discussions even 
though we might think about the role of hybridity within transitional justice as at least in part a 
concern with pre-empting possible forms of resistance. 
 
In the case of managed hybridity, hybrid courts combine a mix of international law, 
domestic law, international staff and/or domestic staff. It was hoped that such hybridity would 
be able to overcome the problems of high cost and geographical distance of the international 
ad hoc tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia by 
ensuring greater legitimacy and local ownership (Mendez 2009). In addition to hybrid courts 
we have seen an increase in a planned hybridity through holism in cases where different 
mechanisms are deliberately intended to complement each other, such as combining the work 
of an international criminal tribunal with a truth commission (for example in Sierra Leone) 
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and/or traditional justice (for example in Rwanda). The arguments given in support of designing 
such hybridity into a formal transitional justice process are that it can draw on the benefits of 
the international and the local at the same time, and thereby maximise the possible positive 
impacts as well as gain greater legitimacy on the ground with the people who have experienced 
the crimes to which a transitional justice process addresses itself (Clark 2007). The desire to 
increase legitimacy can be reasonably attributed to a desire to design a process which is 
accepted by the affected populations. Acceptance of the process necessarily means a lack of 
resistance, and so we can again reasonably assume that a (stated or unstated) goal of such 
measures is to reduce the possibility of resistance to transitional justice from the affected 
populations.  
 
The turn of attention towards local contexts in transitional justice is also part of a desire 
to understand the ways in which people in different places and historical moments select 
strategies themselves which will best allow them to survive and reconstruct their lives (Shaw 
and Waldorf 2010). We can see this in detailed empirical work which illustrates the ways in 
which hybridity may occur through the ‘messiness’ of realities on the ground. Bekerman (2009) 
has observed that in Israel teachers at integrated Palestinian-Jewish schools negotiate and 
transform education policies as part of their coping strategies in tense classroom contexts, 
thereby altering the intended content of integrated-schooling curriculum designed to promote 
peace. In Nepal Bhutanese refugee children display apparently contradictory behaviour when 
they attend human rights education classes at the same time as they engage in political violence, 
in a negotiation of daily life which makes sense for them but which baffles the international 
peace workers (Evans, 2008). And in Guatemala parts of the local population have mobilised 
transitional justice education recommendations to use as their own and to serve their own goals 
in ways not intended by the transitional justice ‘experts’ who introduced the vocabulary and 
policy recommendations in the first place (Oglesby, 2007).  
 9 
 
 
These practices certainly transform the type of peace and justice which is present in 
these places, leading to both a designed (top down) and to an everyday (bottom up) hybridity 
where policies designed with certain purposes in mind are re-shaped in ways which make sense 
on the ground. As Sriram notes, “it is seldom the case that a mixture of local, national, and 
international justice mechanisms is designed – it rather emerges in response to demands at all 
three levels over time, and it may involve a changing mixture of legal, non-legal, and quasi-
legal processes” (2012: 67-68). However, for this paper we do not want to stop here with an 
acceptance that transitional justice is contested and negotiated, leading to different forms of 
hybridity. Whilst this statement in itself is important, we can go further and add value to the 
discussion by focusing particularly on the aspect of resistance. This requires us to ask how we 
can understand those acts which go beyond contestation and which are labelled ‘resistance’. In 
order to do this we turn now to theories of hybrid peace which address resistance in particular 
ways.   
 
2.2 Hybridity and Resistance 
 
If we acknowledge that hybridity as part of transitional justice is both a response to, and 
outcome of, a desire to manage how transitional justice processes are received by different 
groups and individuals, then it is surprising that the transitional justice literature itself has not 
engaged more directly with the concept of resistance. However, theories of hybrid peace do 
include resistance as part of their framing of what leads to and constitutes hybridity. When 
reviewing the literature on hybrid peace one can observe that where resistance as a term is used 
or implied it is rarely comprehensively defined or theoretically explored. This is a missed 
opportunity because it is a rich concept which is useful for the types of subtle and important 
critiques we read in contemporary transitional justice scholarship. Where resistance does 
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feature in work on hybridity it broadly falls into two interconnected roles as (a) a pre-requisite 
for the existence of hybridity and (b) as an integral part of what can be described as hybridity. 
 
Much of the hybridity literature begins from a point of criticism of liberal peacebuilding 
interventions (Laffey and Nadarajah 2012), or at least observations that they are not always 
locally relevant, contextually informed or consultative. The idea that the worldview and norms 
promoted by liberal peace are not necessarily locally meaningful, or even acceptable, leads 
authors to suggest that resistance to such interventions will (inevitably) follow. Leeuwen, 
Verkoren and Boedeltje point to the individualist and secularist worldview of the European 
Enlightenment which forms the basis of liberal peacebuilding and assert that “As a 
consequence, liberal interventions may face resistance” (2012: 303) in local contexts which 
have, for example, a more communitarian view of society, rights and obligations. Importantly, 
resistance in such contexts results not only from a disjuncture between two or more worldviews, 
but also from geopolitical power imbalances which make possible the attempted imposition of 
one over the other. Resistance is thereby an action of those who are oppressed against those 
who oppress: “distinct local realities disturb and resist the hegemonic visions of policymakers” 
(Ibid: 311). When local realities come face to face with liberal interventionism, in the ‘contact 
zone’ described by Peterson (2012) the resulting resistance is one possible pre-condition for the 
emergence of hybridity. Referring to the case of the Solomon Islands, Richmond describes the 
mutual misunderstanding by internationals and locals of each other’s actions and values, which 
“shows how little they are able to understand each other – echoing mutual resistance and 
through these emerging agencies, the hints of hybridities to come” (2011: 126).   
 
According to Richmond “Peacebuilding-as-resistance appears, at least from the local 
level, to offer the main avenue through which to shape the emerging political environment, 
though this is predicated on the ability to resist overwhelming technical superiority, and to 
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modify it marginally, or only to mimic it” (2011: 116). Here we come to the second connected 
role which resistance plays in hybridity, as an ongoing and integral part of that which can be 
described and observed as hybridity on the ground. MacGinty in his model of hybridity wishes 
to “capture the dynamism associated with peace, conflict, and the interaction between local and 
international actors in seeking to bring conflict to an end” in what he sees as “the constant 
processes of social negotiation, coalescence, cooperation, and conflict that are associated with 
the creation of hybrid forms of peace and processes of peacemaking” (2011: 208). Building on 
this, MacGinty (Ibid) features resistance as one of the four key elements of hybrid peace: ability 
of liberal peace agents to enforce acceptance of the liberal peace; ability of liberal peace agents 
to incentivise local engagement with the liberal peace; ability of local actors to ignore, resist, 
and subvert the liberal peace; and ability of local actors to present alternatives to the liberal 
peace. Here is a dichotomy between locals who may hold the agency and have the opportunity 
structure to resist, and liberal peacebuilding actors who may respond to perceived local 
resistance and seek to engage with local actors and their practices. The response of liberal 
actors, particularly with regard to the selection of local partners and choices over how to engage, 
can affect the type of hybridity which emerges. This can be seen in the work of Jarstad and 
Olsson on Afghanistan (2012) in their reflection on the relative stability of different forms of 
hybrid peace vis-a-vis different forms of local ownership, and in the work of Wallis on Timor-
Leste (2012) regarding the importance of making space for cultural agency and thus a hybrid 
peace which is meaningful for people on the ground.  
 
Resistance, however, is not always a given in every situation of hybridity. Locals may 
also support or be co-opted by liberal peacebuilding. Thus there is a spectrum of actions on 
which we may find subversion (a purposive attempt to circumvent liberal peace), cooperation 
and agonism (MacGinty 2011: 77, 2011: 86). This prompts us to ask: in which situations does 
resistance become the preferred action of choice, or indeed a possible action of choice? And 
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how do we know resistance when we see it? It is only through engaging with questions such as 
these that we are able to fully understand the relevance of such a dynamic at the liberal-local 
interface. However, the literature on resistance and hybridity makes some limiting assumptions 
or perhaps suffers from certain omissions.  
 
Laffey and Nadarajah criticise recent scholarship on liberal-local hybrid peace for 
rendering “hybridity as a problem-solving social-scientific concept equated with mixing or 
interaction” (2012: 404). In this way, we can see how resistance itself comes to be understood 
more instrumentally as a precondition of hybridity; one piece in the puzzle with its role to play. 
The way in which resistance is referred to as one pre-condition of hybridity also implies that 
there is an action or an object of enquiry which can be labelled as ‘resistance’. These actions of 
resistance can be identified either as visible, concerted and public action, or in their more 
everyday forms (Richmond 2010). In addition, resistance is often evoked as the preserve of the 
‘local’ in the interface. The logic follows that the liberal peace seeks to impose a certain set of 
norms and practices onto societies where they may not be meaningful or considered legitimate. 
This leads to resistance by those who are marginalised by the attempt to impose such a liberal 
peace. In turn resistance brings the liberal and local face to face in a negotiation which results 
in a hybrid form of peace which is challenged and shaped over time. In this logic resistance is 
an action undertaken by a particular set of actors in response to the hegemony of another set of 
actors and the norms they promote.  
 
In the following section this paper moves beyond a static understanding of resistance as 
a component in a typology of the relationship between the local and the liberal, an approach 
which is at the core of thinking on hybrid peace, and towards an understanding of resistance as 
relational, i.e. defined by the subjective position of the actor who is resisting or labelling an act 
as resistance. In order to do this we need to engage with literature on resistance more directly.  
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3 Asking What Counts as Resistance 
 
Scholarship on resistance has undergone some significant developments since the 
1980s. Prior to this, resistance was primarily understood as organised group action against states 
(Fletcher 2001: 44). However, influenced by the well known work of academics such as Scott 
(see for example 1985) resistance is now understood by many anthropologists, sociologists and 
political philosophers as something present in the everyday. These approaches try to understand 
the subtlety of resistance and the sites and moments where it may be found. As such resistance 
is also conceptualised as the result of the agency of an individual in an everyday encounter far 
beyond the public spaces where it had previously been assumed to be enacted. Such an approach 
is valuable for its movement beyond the limits of a narrow definition of resistance which cannot 
capture the multi-faceted nature of power or agency. However, it creates a methodological trap 
in which contestations inherent in daily life may be caught by the gaze of the researcher and 
labelled ‘everyday resistance’. The analytical danger here is that acts may be labelled as 
resistance which are not understood as resistance acts by the actors themselves, with 
implications for how resistance is studied, described and understood. 
 
One approach to this methodological tension may be to think more sociologically about 
the nature of resistance and ask ‘what counts as resistance?’ from the vantage points of different 
actors. To clarify it is helpful to draw on theoretical work on resistance from the discipline of 
geography. In the edited collection Geographies of Resistance (1997) both Pile and Keith’s 
contributions argue that resistance should not be assumed to arise from innate political 
subjectivities, but can only be understood in relation to local power relations, and intended and 
received meanings. Resistance itself as a label of action is defined through the creation of these 
subjectivities. Where the term resistance departs from other words we may use, such as 
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contestation or negotiation, is in the social context in which the motivation and legitimacy of 
the action is judged. Actions which resist are understood, by those who label them as such, as 
deviant by their very nature, either in terms of norms or material projects of organising society. 
They are ‘against’ that which is being resisted, either through a direct attack or through attempts 
to alter the intended outcomes of the avowed target of resistance. What is vital to highlight here 
is that the process by which an act comes to be labelled as ‘resistance’ is a subjective one.  
 
As MacGinty elaborates “All individuals and communities experience constant and 
formative framing that signifies what is valuable, intelligible and deviant. The self-narratives 
that individuals attempt to construct and maintain for themselves are in fact the result of a 
complex process of negotiation and renegotiation that is bounded within socio-political and 
economic circumstance” (2012: 168). Here the distinction between oppressor and oppressed 
which is so important in many studies of resistance becomes less clear. Writing on resistance 
and international law Rajagopal asserts that resistance must always work, to some extent, within 
the parameters set by that which is being resisted, thereby risking cooption. This work rejects 
an absolute wall of separation between resistance and forms of hegemony and views “forms of 
resistance as various valid ways of conceiving the world” (2003: 11).  
 
Building on this literature we can go further than the models of hybridity do, by looking 
at how certain acts come to be defined as resistance, a process which can provide a fruitful 
avenue for exploring the nature of the relationships between different actors at times of 
transition. Moreover, drawing on the theoretical work of scholars such as Rajagopal, this paper 
argues that if we treat resistance as a valid object of enquiry, rather than dismiss it as a form of 
deviance problematic for policy goals, it can reveal the alternative visions of peace and justice 
which may be present in any given society, that is to say the “various valid ways of conceiving 
the world” (Ibid). This will tell us about power relations between actors, how certain visions of 
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peace and justice come to be seen as more legitimate than others and what alternative visions 
might look like. In the following section this approach will be applied to transitional justice as 
part of liberal peacebuilding in order to suggest some ways in which it can be analytically 
helpful.   
 
4 Resistance to Transitional Justice: An Application of the Relational Approach 
 
4.1 Resisting Transitional Justice? 
 
Campbell and Turner (2008) suggest that the formation of formal transitional justice 
agreements may lead to those who question them being accused of being harmful to the 
transition. In transitional justice literature which addresses resistance a variety of types of 
resisting actors are identified. Subotić’s (2009) work focuses on the strategic and subversive 
choices of states in the Former Yugoslavia, shaped by domestic demands, normative resistance, 
political backlash and political instability. In contrast, Thomson (2011) analyses three types of 
resistance by ordinary Rwandans to Gacaca: staying on the sidelines; irreverent compliance; 
and withdrawn muteness. Taking another approach Jacobs highlights how reconciliatory 
gestures towards the Aboriginal peoples in Australia “far from settling the nation down into a 
state of calm co-habitation, can activate a range of unexpected refusals and resistances” (1997: 
205), resistance which does not necessarily come from those who have been historically 
oppressed but from those in positions of power.  
 
In each case the construction and labelling of the act as ‘resistance’ is an action 
undertaken from a particular positionality. For example, state actors who ‘resist’ cooperation 
with international courts may not view themselves as ‘resistors’ but instead politicians who are 
negotiating political stability, and the support of constituencies. Little writes of the case of 
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Northern Ireland that practices of democracy may in fact be more ‘normal’ the further they 
move away from the liberal ideal-type of the Belfast Agreement, despite criticisms of local 
politicians for obstructing the democratic process (2009). If we take the case of Colombia, Diaz 
(2008) has highlighted how particular non-governmental organisations oppose certain 
transitional justice measures, such as paramilitary demobilisation, not because they are opposed 
to transitional justice, but because they conceive of it in a more radical way, as “real political 
transformation”, rather than an instrument of the most powerful. These are the kinds of debates 
which represent the working out of political questions in a contested space. In Diaz’s work we 
see not only differences in the types of transitional justice policies being supported, but how 
these are representative of deeper conflicts between different conceptions of justice, some of 
which become more dominant and are seen as more legitimate in a given context. 
 
If we apply a relational approach to resistance, drawing on the geographies of resistance 
outlined in section 3 in particular, we are better able to avoid categorising actors in ways which 
reproduce simplistic and homogenising dichotomies. The work of Kent (2011) demonstrates 
that an international imposition/local resistance dichotomy cannot adequately explain the 
various ways in which East Timorese survivors are reproducing, resisting and transforming 
official discourses of justice and nation-building. We should also be wary of assuming that 
certain actors are more likely to resist, or that resistance itself is targeted against domination by 
the marginalised or oppressed. In Jacobs’ work (1997) on Australia those who resist may not 
be the most marginalised seeking a more progressive politics. Sriram also cautions against 
assuming a positive role for resistance against activities of international actors, even if the 
critiques against such actors may stand. For Sriram “this resistance and the hybridity that results 
are not unproblematic” (2012: 59). Finally, one cannot assume or take at face value that certain 
acts are indeed resistance. Katz has warned that contemporary understandings of resistance 
have become sloppy and too easily use the label ‘resistance’ (2003: 262). We can see in work 
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on transitional justice and silence that the act of muteness, which stands in opposition to an 
obsession with confession, spoken memories and public forms of catharsis, may not always 
indicate resistance. Instead it may be itself a form of peacebuilding (Eastmond and Selimović 
2012).  
 
4.2 Implications of a Relational Approach  
 
Brudholm, in work on both South Africa’s transitional justice process and the Nazi 
regime in Germany, argues that the refusal to forgive and reconcile “can be the reflex expression 
of a moral protest and ambition that might be as permissible and admirable as the posture of 
forgiveness” (2008: 4). He goes on to assert that “when advocates or scholars arguing the case 
for forgiveness and healing lose sight of the contestability of the values they promote, they also 
lose sight of the possible moral legitimacy of some victims’ preservation of resentment” (Ibid). 
Thus “although the refusal to forgive can be testimony of self-righteous rigor, vengeance, or a 
reduction of wrongdoers to what they have done, it is essential that the discussion of forgiveness 
and its alternatives take more seriously the possibilities and sources of various kinds of more 
or less legitimate resistance” (Brudholm and Rosoux 2009: 48).  
 
Researching actors’ perceptions of what counts as resistance might elaborate an 
international/local actor divide which is so common in recent scholarship on legitimacy issues 
in transitional justice and on hybrid peace. However, it is more likely to elaborate the multiple 
positions of any given actor in terms of identity formation, level of analysis and insider/outsider 
boundaries. This allows us to move away from dichotomies which to some extent constrain 
debate and analysis in this area. It also allows us to think beyond the confines of the formal 
transitional justice process which may well be composed of identified/self-identified 
‘international’ and ‘local’ actors to learn more about the broader context in which actors’ 
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different interests inform their perspectives on truth, justice and peace (Androff 2012: 314 and 
316).  
 
Perceptions of what counts as resistance are also informed by perceptions of the 
legitimacy of that which is being resisted. Sriram writes, in reference to Sudan’s state response 
to the International Criminal Court’s indictment of President Omar al-Bashir, that “He and his 
government have also engaged in what might be termed acts of resistance, albeit quite cynical 
ones, through the creation of special criminal courts for Darfur, which have to date not handled 
any high-level cases involving serious crimes” (2012: 63). Two points can be made here. 
Firstly, that the use of the words “what might be termed acts of resistance” is exactly the 
pertinent point. We need to know how such an act comes to be understood as resistance, from 
which vantage point and with what effect. This will then tell us about the relations between 
different actors, their mutual perceptions of legitimacy, and the differences in their normative 
positions and visions for peace and justice. The positionality of the actor who names resistance 
is key. Secondly, if we reflect again on MacGinty’s typology of hybrid peace in which there is 
a distinction made between local actors engaging with liberal peace or, in contrast, ignoring, 
resisting or subverting liberal peace we can see that perhaps such a neat distinction does not 
always hold. In Sriram’s case, and in others such as victim participation in the Extraordinary 
Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia3, we can see that it is possible for local actors to engage 
fully in the liberal peace, on the liberal peace’s terms, but in ways not envisaged, predicted or 
desired by liberal peace advocates.  
 
 The approach to resistance outlined here can also perhaps help to re-
contextualise and historicise hybridity. Laffey and Nadarajah criticise “shallow” 
                                                          
3 Thanks go to Julie Bernath for this raising this valuable point and illustrating it with informal examples from 
her field stays in Cambodia. 
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understandings of resistance where it is conceptualised as “a domestic phenomenon referring 
to external relations with local communities deploying non-liberal forms of decisionmaking or 
conflict resolution” and as a “newly positive engagement between liberal and non-liberal 
worlds” (2012: 406). However, if we understand resistance as constructed in a social context in 
which legitimacy and deviancy are constantly negotiated between different postionalities, rather 
than instrumentally, we can bring back in the importance of struggle. McEvoy and McGregor 
remind us of the importance, as researchers, of understanding the politicised nature of 
transitional justice and of bearing in mind the political and social struggles which place dealing 
with the past on the political agenda in the first place (2008: 4-6). With this in mind it is vital 
to see resistance not only as a response to liberal peacebuilding and thus a pre-condition of 
hybridity, but as something which is part of a longer history of struggle over the terms of social 
and political life. This in turn helps us to understand the broader context in which transitional 
justice processes are embedded and the limits of the contributions which a formal transitional 
justice process can make to dealing with the past and creating a sustainable and just peace.  
 
Connected to this issue is the nature of the resistor as deviant. The explicit and implicit 
desire for consensus in formal transitional justice processes casts those who are perceived to be 
resisting as problematic for the eventual realisation of the goals of the process. This is a 
particularly sensitive issue in the context of transitional justice where the normative goals – 
peace and justice – are often put on a pedestal as ‘untouchable’. The nature of the human rights 
violations with which transitional justice mechanisms concern themselves means that debates 
over the nature of the response are emotionally charged and ethically sensitive. The developing 
and therefore incomplete nature of transitional justice, both in terms of best practice and 
international law precedent, might explain the tension between power that is wielded for the 
‘good’ of transitional justice and resistance coming from unsatisfied victims or concerned 
spoilers. In the case of the former we might judge resistance as part of a messy development of 
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a complicated field of law and practice which will be imperfect but which seeks laudable goals. 
Resistance means something very different in such a context, when compared to other cases of 
resistance against oppressive political power, the more common empirical contexts on which 
studies of resistance focus. In the latter case the spoilers are less credible as actors by the nature 
of their intention to disrupt justice and again this type of resistance is quite different to other 
forms which are studied. This leaves us with a dilemma: should resistance to transitional be 
subject to a different moral evaluation? 
 
There has been some interesting debate on the nature of transitional justice as either 
‘exceptional’ or ‘ordinary’ and thus to ask whether there are specific conditions of transitional 
societies which render the kind of justice being implemented as necessarily different from 
settled or established democracies. As Ohlin describes it, justice is meant to evoke a universal, 
normative goal whereas transitional defines an exceptional and limited moment (2007). 
Addressing this dilemma Eisikovits raises the “possibility that consolidating a democracy 
cannot be subject to the same moral standards we would use to evaluate the regime it hopes to 
produce” with the warning that more theoretical work needs to be done on the extent to which 
moral complacency can be allowed during transitions and for how long a state can be viewed 
as transitional (2013: 236). 
 
This debate has clear ramifications for how resistance to transitional justice is 
understood, analysed and judged. Like the ‘exceptional’ versus ‘ordinary’ debate much more 
work needs to be done on resistance in transitional contexts and connecting these different 
discussions together. The purpose of this paper was to highlight the importance of such work 
on resistance to transitional justice, to explore the use and limits of resistance as understood in 
theories of hybrid peace, and to argue for an approach to resistance in transitional contexts 
which is grounded in geographies of resistance which emphasise its relational nature. It is hoped 
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that the intellectual exploration begun here has gone far enough to illustrate that if we can listen 
to the voices which are dismissed as ‘deviant’ and engage with them as legitimate subjects of 
analysis then we may be able to hear the articulations of alternative visions of peace and justice. 
The open articulation of such difference and disagreement, I would argue, is at the foundation 
of a sustainable and just peace. 
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